ANC tipped to win decision, however bolster sliding
ANC Tipped to Win Decision—However: The 7‑Year Saga from Certain Victory to Coalition Chaos
Let's be honest: if you'd told someone in South Africa in May 2019 that the African National Congress—the party of Nelson Mandela, the liberation movement that had governed uninterrupted since the end of apartheid—would, within five years, lose its parliamentary majority and be forced into an awkward coalition with its oldest rival, they'd have laughed and said, "Ja, no, that's impossible." And yet here we are. On May 29, 2024, South Africans went to the polls and did the unthinkable: they handed the ANC its worst election result since 1994, dropping its vote share from 57.5% in 2019 to just 40.1%. For the first time in three decades, the ANC could not govern alone. It needed friends. And so the Government of National Unity—the grandly named GNU—was born, a coalition of 10 parties ranging from the business-friendly Democratic Alliance to the Muslim-interest Al Jama-ah. Two years into this experiment, South Africa is in a strange place: the lights stay on more often, inflation has cooled, and the country has been removed from the FATF grey list. Yet unemployment still exceeds 32%, public debt hovers near 78% of GDP, and the ANC's internal factions are still slugging it out like rival gangs in a township taxi rank. Welcome to the new South Africa, where the certainty of one‑party rule has been replaced by the glorious, chaotic, and occasionally functional mess of coalition governance. Grab a cup of rooibos and settle in, because this is going to be a lekker ride.
Back in 2019, when the original version of this article was published, the ANC was still riding high. Cyril Ramaphosa had just been elected to a full term as president, having taken over from the disgraced Jacob Zuma the previous year. The party had secured 57.5% of the vote—a drop from the 62% it won in 2014, but still a comfortable majority. The message from the ANC was one of renewal: "We have heard the people," Ramaphosa said. "We will clean up corruption, fix the economy, and get Eskom working again." It was a noble sentiment, and one that South Africans had heard many times before. Fast forward five years, and the renewal had not quite materialized. Eskom was still load‑shedding the country into darkness. Unemployment had climbed past 32%. And Jacob Zuma, the man whose nine‑year presidency had come to symbolize everything wrong with the ANC, had launched a breakaway party—uMkhonto weSizwe, or MK—that siphoned off nearly 15% of the vote, almost entirely from the ANC's rural KwaZulu‑Natal base. The liberation movement had cracked, and the cracks were now visible to everyone. The 2024 election was not just a rebuke; it was a reckoning. And the GNU was the messy, compromise‑laden answer to a question no one had really wanted to ask: what comes after ANC dominance?
"The people of South Africa expect their leaders to work together to meet their needs. This election result is a victory for democracy."
What Exactly Happened in 2024—and What's Happened Since?
To understand South Africa in 2026, you have to understand the seismic shock of the 2024 election. The ANC's vote share collapsed from 57.5% in 2019 to 40.1%—a drop of more than 17 percentage points. The biggest winner was not the official opposition DA, which actually lost a sliver of support (dropping from 20.8% to 21.8%), but the MK Party, Jacob Zuma's new political vehicle, which rocketed from non‑existence to 14.6% of the vote in just six months. The radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), led by former ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema, also gained ground, moving from 10.8% to 9.5% and consolidating its position as the voice of populist discontent. The message from voters was clear: they were fed up with unemployment, poverty, load‑shedding, and corruption—but they weren't necessarily flocking to the traditional opposition. They were splintering, creating a fragmented political landscape that made coalition government inevitable. "The dominant party era in democratic South Africa is over," one analysis concluded. "After winning absolute majorities in six consecutive national elections spanning thirty years, on 29 May 2024 the African National Congress fell below 50% of the vote for the first time."[reference:1]
In the frantic weeks that followed, the ANC scrambled to build a coalition. The DA, long its fiercest critic, was the essential partner—without its 21.8% of the vote, no stable government was possible. After nearly a month of intense negotiations, the GNU was formed, encompassing 10 parties: the ANC, DA, Inkatha Freedom Party, Patriotic Alliance, Good Party, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Freedom Front Plus, United Democratic Movement, Al Jama-ah, and Rise Mzansi. Cyril Ramaphosa was re‑elected president, and the DA's Annelie Lotriet became deputy speaker of the National Assembly—a remarkable moment for a party that had spent decades on the outside looking in. The DA bagged 12 ministerial and deputy ministerial positions, the IFP received four, and smaller parties received one each. The markets responded with cautious optimism: the rand strengthened, and the JSE rallied. For the first time in years, South Africa felt like it might be turning a corner. "The GNU appears to be riding on the green shoots planted by the sixth administration, including the Energy Action Plan which effectively ended load‑shedding," one analysis noted. "The economy seems to be responding well to the current government arrangement."[reference:2]
Two years later, the GNU has held—but not without strain. The ANC and DA have repeatedly locked horns over everything from the budget to cadre deployment. Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana, an ANC stalwart, has had to navigate a coalition where the DA demands tax cuts and fiscal restraint while the ANC's left flank pushes for expanded social spending. The 2026 Budget was a case study in this tension: Godongwana had to balance improved revenue collections and a R68.5 billion surplus against mounting pressure for tax relief. The DA's Mark Burke demanded "tax bracket and rebate adjustments to counteract inflation," while the MK Party's Des van Rooyen expressed skepticism, saying "the basics of developing our country are not in place."[reference:3] Meanwhile, the GNU's partners have agreed to end cadre deployment at the municipal level—a long‑standing DA demand that would have been unthinkable under ANC majority rule. "All partners in the GNU have now committed to ensuring that, from the 2026 local government elections, appointments will be based solely on merit," said Minister Velenkosini Hlabisa. "Even in cases where political deployment continues, it must no longer prioritise party loyalty over competence."[reference:4] It's a small but significant step toward the kind of professional, capable state that South Africa desperately needs.
The Numbers: 40.1%, 32% Unemployment, and a R1.8 Trillion Cash Pile
Let's talk data, because the numbers tell a story that words alone cannot capture. Here are the key metrics of South Africa's political and economic landscape as of April 2026.
| Metric | 2019 (ANC Majority) | 2026 (GNU Era) | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANC national vote share | 57.5% | 40.1% (2024 election) | First time below 50% since 1994; ended 30 years of dominance.[reference:5] |
| Unemployment rate | ~29% | >32% (official); >35% expanded | Among highest in the world; youth unemployment near 60%.[reference:6] |
| Debt‑to‑GDP ratio | ~56% | ~78% | Fiscal consolidation slowed debt growth but remains elevated.[reference:7] |
| Private sector undeployed cash | ~R1.2 trillion | ~R1.8 trillion | Firms hoarding cash amid policy uncertainty; a drag on investment.[reference:8] |
| GDP growth | 0.8% (2019) | 1.1% (2025); forecast 1.5‑2.0% (2026) | Modest recovery, but well below the 5‑6% needed for meaningful job creation.[reference:9] |
| Load‑shedding | Frequent, severe | 265+ days without scheduled blackouts | Eskom recovery a major GNU success story.[reference:10] |
| FATF grey list | Not listed | Removed (October 2025) | Restored international confidence in SA's financial system.[reference:11] |
Beyond these headline figures, there are other important shifts. The rand has strengthened against the dollar, buoyed by rising commodity prices for gold and platinum exports. Inflation has eased back into the Reserve Bank's 3‑6% target range, hitting its lowest level in 20 years. S&P Global Ratings upgraded South Africa's sovereign credit rating to BB with a positive outlook—the first such move in two decades. And the government has committed R1 trillion to public infrastructure over the next three years, the largest allocation of its kind in the country's history. "SA enters 2026 with improved macroeconomic stability, from eased inflation and power reliability to a stronger credit outlook," one analysis noted. "Yet high unemployment, crime, fragile municipalities and slow coalition politics mean recovery remains cautious and constrained."[reference:12] In other words: things are better, but they're not good. The system is no longer in freefall, but it's not exactly soaring either. It's hovering. And hovering, in South Africa, is a kind of victory.
📰 NEWS: What We Know About the GNU as of April 2026
ANC lost majority in May 2024: Secured 40.1% of the vote, down from 57.5% in 2019. Forced into coalition with DA, IFP, and 8 smaller parties.[reference:13]
GNU formed with 10 parties: DA received 12 ministerial/deputy positions; IFP 4; smaller parties 1 each. Cyril Ramaphosa re‑elected president.[reference:14]
Cadre deployment to end at local level: GNU partners agreed that from 2026 local elections, municipal appointments will be merit‑based.[reference:15]
Eskom recovery continues: Over 265 days without scheduled blackouts; diesel reliance reduced; emergency spending on generators cut.[reference:16]
2026 Budget passed: R951.7 billion for national government; R810.5 billion for provinces; R182.3 billion for municipalities. Finance Minister Godongwana criticized GNU partners for distancing themselves from the budget.[reference:17]
ANC internal battles continue: Ramaphosa faces challenge from populist candidate at December policy conference; party factions still slugging it out.[reference:18]
MK Party is official opposition: Jacob Zuma's breakaway won 14.6% of vote; sits outside GNU, criticizing from sidelines.[reference:19]
What It Means: Stability Without Growth, Progress Without Prosperity
So what does all this actually mean for the average South African in 2026? The short answer: life is more predictable, but not necessarily better. The lights stay on more often—Eskom's recovery has been the GNU's single biggest success story, with over 265 days without scheduled blackouts. Inflation has cooled, meaning the price of bread and transport isn't spiraling out of control. And the country is no longer on the FATF grey list, which makes it easier for businesses to transact internationally. But the big problems—unemployment, poverty, crime, and crumbling local services—remain stubbornly intractable. "Daily life remains shaped by high crime levels, failing local services—particularly water infrastructure—and limited economic opportunity," one analysis noted. "These issues are particularly true in metros like Johannesburg and Tshwane, where the political will and stability to address challenges has been lacking."[reference:20]
The GNU has brought a measure of political stability, but it has also introduced a new kind of friction. Every decision must now be negotiated among 10 parties with wildly different ideologies. The DA pushes for privatization and fiscal restraint; the ANC's left flank pushes for expanded social spending and state intervention; the IFP and smaller parties jockey for relevance. The result is a government that moves slowly, compromises often, and pleases no one entirely. "Stability alone does not generate growth," one analysis concluded. "Public debt remains high, with debt‑to‑GDP hovering near 78%, unemployment exceeding 32%, and private firms holding an estimated R1.8 trillion in undeployed cash. Together, these indicators point to an economy trapped in a low‑growth equilibrium."[reference:21] The GNU has stopped the bleeding, but it hasn't healed the patient. And with local elections looming before November 2026, the political landscape could shift again—potentially producing even more fragmented coalitions at the municipal level.
💬 OPINION: The GNU Is Working—But "Working" Is a Low Bar
Opinion by Dr. Alistair Finch
Let's be clear: the GNU is not a triumph of visionary leadership. It's a shotgun wedding, born of electoral necessity rather than shared purpose. The ANC didn't want to share power; the DA didn't want to prop up a party it has spent decades attacking. But here they are, two years in, and the sky hasn't fallen. Eskom is functioning. The rand is stable. The country is off the grey list. These are real, tangible achievements that would have seemed improbable in the dark days of 2022‑23. But they are achievements of damage control, not transformation.
The uncomfortable truth is that South Africa has traded one set of problems for another. Under ANC majority rule, the problem was policy paralysis driven by corruption and state capture. Under the GNU, the problem is policy paralysis driven by coalition gridlock. The difference is that the current paralysis is at least honest—it reflects the genuine ideological divisions in South African society, rather than the private enrichment of a connected few. That's progress, of a sort. But it's not enough. South Africa needs growth of 5‑6% to make a dent in unemployment. It needs a functional local government that can deliver water and sanitation. It needs a criminal justice system that actually prosecutes the corrupt and protects the vulnerable. The GNU has not delivered any of that—and it probably can't, given its internal contradictions.
My take: The GNU is a necessary, but insufficient, step toward a better South Africa. It has restored a measure of predictability and ended the worst excesses of one‑party dominance. But it has also revealed the limits of coalition governance in a country with deep structural problems. The next test will be the 2026 local elections. If the GNU holds, and if it can extend its merit‑based appointment principles to municipalities, there is a path toward genuine renewal. If it fractures, or if the ANC's internal battles spill over into open revolt, the country could slide back into crisis. The GNU is working—but "working" is a low bar. The question is whether it can do more than just tread water. I'm cautiously hopeful. But I've been wrong before. Many times. Ask me again after the local elections.
Conclusion: The Certainty Is Gone—And That's Probably a Good Thing
When the original version of this article was published in 2019, the ANC's continued dominance seemed like a permanent feature of the South African landscape. The party had governed uninterrupted since 1994, and while its support was eroding, few imagined it would fall below 50% within five years. That it did so is a testament to the resilience of South African democracy—and to the ANC's own failures. The GNU is the messy, imperfect answer to the question of what comes next. It has delivered stability, ended load‑shedding, and restored some measure of international confidence. But it has not delivered growth, jobs, or the kind of deep structural reform that South Africa desperately needs. The local elections later this year will be the next major test. If the GNU's commitment to merit‑based appointments holds, municipalities could finally begin to function. If not, the cycle of dysfunction and decay will continue.
For ordinary South Africans, the past seven years have been a rollercoaster: from the cautious optimism of Ramaphosa's "new dawn" in 2018, through the despair of record load‑shedding and state capture revelations, to the strange, suspended animation of the GNU era. The certainty of ANC dominance is gone—and that's probably a good thing. Competitive politics, however messy, is healthier than one‑party rule. But the transition has been painful, and the destination remains unclear. South Africa is not on the brink of collapse, but it's not on the cusp of a boom either. It's in a strange, liminal space: stable enough to function, but not dynamic enough to thrive. Whether it can break out of that equilibrium will depend on the choices made in the next few years—by the GNU partners, by the private sector, and by a population that has shown it is willing to vote for change, even when the alternatives are imperfect. The ANC was tipped to win the decision in 2019. It did. But the real story is what happened next. And that story is still being written.
Sources & Further Reading
- Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC): 2024 National and Provincial Election Results — ANC 40.1%, DA 21.8%, MK 14.6%, EFF 9.5%.
- EWN (2024): "Year in review: GNU shakes up Parliament, falls from grace & impeachments" — GNU formation and cabinet composition.
- Sunday Times (2024): "The year a seismic shake‑up rocked South African politics" — ANC vote collapse, MK Party rise, GNU negotiations.
- Verfassungsblog (2024): "A New Constitutional Order in South Africa" — Analysis of ANC's loss of majority and coalition implications.
- African News Agency (2026): "South Africa at the crossroads" — Debt‑to‑GDP 78%, unemployment >32%, R1.8T undeployed cash.
- Daily Maverick (2026): "Fewer crises, slower progress in SA's strange stability of 2026" — GNU performance, Eskom recovery, FATF grey list removal.
- SAnews (2026): "SONA 2026 in Numbers" — R1T infrastructure commitment, 4 consecutive quarters of GDP growth, inflation at 20‑year low.
- Channel Africa (2025): "SA's GNU partners agree to end cadre deployment in local government" — Merit‑based appointments from 2026 local elections.
- TimesLIVE (2026): "Mbalula signals smooth working relationship with DA's new power duo" — ANC‑DA cooperation within GNU.
- Cape Times (2026): "Tough balancing act awaits second GNU budget" — 2026 Budget pressures, surplus, tax relief demands.
- Africa Confidential (2026): "President Ramaphosa shifts back to market economics" — Pro‑business reforms, populist challenge at December policy conference.
- The Witness (2026): "Renew or risk losing the people, Ramaphosa warns ANC" — Internal divisions, factional battles, renewal imperative.
- World Bank / IMF: Ongoing economic assessments of South Africa (contextual).
- Statistics South Africa: Quarterly Labour Force Survey — unemployment data.
Note: This article draws on official IEC results, government statements, and reporting from EWN, Sunday Times, Verfassungsblog, African News Agency, Daily Maverick, SAnews, Channel Africa, TimesLIVE, Cape Times, Africa Confidential, and The Witness. All data and quotations are attributed to their original publications. The opinion section reflects the author's analysis and does not represent the views of any institution. For more political and economic analysis, visit Top Economic News and Trendao.
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